POUHINE

Pūrākau

  • Thames-Coromandel Floods Again: The Answers Are There, The Action Isn’t

    Thames-Coromandel Floods Again: The Answers Are There, The Action Isn’t

    Last week, a tropical low hit the communities where I come from on the East Coast and where I live now in Thames-Coromandel.

    Punaruku, our whānau whenua on the East Coast, was devastated and cut off. Big logs and brown water coming off the hills destroyed my nanny’s whare. Our urupa, where my mum lies, was significantly damaged. It’s been two years since mum passed, and that’s one of the reasons why I’m writing this. Many of our whānau lost their homes and livelihoods. But as they invariably do, these big, hearty Ngātis just get stuck in, clearing roads, helping whānau recover, and cleaning up everything.

    At home in Thames-Coromandel, a local firefighter said the damage here was “the worst he’d seen in 30 years, worse than Cyclone Gabrielle”. This is a story about councils failing to implement their own agreed Māori-led solutions. Again.

    States of emergency were declared across five regions. On the East Coast, Te Araroa, Onepoto, and Wharekahika were among the worst affected. In Pāpāmoa, two people died after a slip damaged a house. At Mount Maunganui, a major landslide at a campground left six people unaccounted for, including two teenagers.

    There is a pattern on repeat here. Tauranga City Council completed a 2025 hazard report for the exact location where the landslide occurred. The report stopped at the fence line, focusing on homes while ignoring the campsite across the road. Fire and Emergency called the council at 5.51am, reporting a slip near the holiday park. Hours later, the fatal landslide occurred. Mayor Mahé Drysdale now supports a“full, independent review” as if the council’s own hazard report doesn’t already tell the story.

    On his way to Tauranga and the East Coast, Prime Minister Christopher Luxon made a flying visit to Thames for what appeared to be a token photoshoot. He didn’t get his red bands on or stop to talk to us who stood outside TCDC waiting to discuss the lack of climate response, or his government’s $6 billion resilience fund cut after Gabrielle.

    The new TCDC mayor, Peter Revell, told one of our people on the quiet that someone else should be managing this crisis. (We understood that to mean he didn’t feel he was the person for the job). A while back, I personally handed him and his staff a copy of our research. Kaupapa Māori-led research of this kind has never been conducted in this rohe before. Our Hauraki Māori Weathering Cyclone Gabrielle study documents what happened for our whānau during the disaster and outlines what needs to change.

    What We Documented During Gabrielle

    When civil defence abandoned isolated Hauraki communities during Gabrielle in 2023, a marae desperately needed a generator for displaced whānau. Civil defence said none were available. The same day, a helicopter flew overhead carrying three generators to a wealthy, predominantly Pākehā community.

    When civil defence finally showed up at the evacuation centre that Hauraki whānau had established and were running, they tried to commandeer the food and resources to redistribute to people they deemed more deserving. Our houseless community members were turned away from official centres. They were told they weren’t eligible because they were already sleeping rough. Because they were already homeless, they were considered less deserving during a humanitarian crisis in 2023.

    As one participant put it: “It reeks of 21st century, well-tuned, well-willed institutional racism.”

    Within 6 to 12 hours of being treated as the poor cousins, Hauraki Māori communities had activated their own emergency networks. They already knew who needed dialysis, who required medication, and who lived alone. They knew their whenua, their weather patterns, their people through environmental tohu and mātauranga.

    Whānau took over a local school and transformed it into an emergency centre with beds, kai, separate areas for families, and even a room for pets. As one participant described it: “Supporting whānau, making them feel comfortable, make sure they were warm and had a beautiful place where they were and feeding them. It didn’t matter who walked in the door.”

    One community leader was direct: “We’ve got eyes and ears on the ground. We’ve got gumboots and raincoats on the ground that can tell you what’s going on. The point is, if they had listened to the locals, they would have been able to do something about it prior to all of that happening.”

    What the Research Provides

    Our research used the Pū-Rā-Kā-Ū framework (Wirihana, 2012), adapted to intentionally put participant voices first. Homegrown solutions from the people who know. The research outlines a Matike Mai approach that recognises marae-based emergency management hubs as critical infrastructure. It calls for amendments to the Local Government Act 2002 and Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 to embed Māori leadership, and for removing Building Act barriers that prevent whānau from using papakāinga housing models in post-disaster recovery.

    Thames-Coromandel District Council staff participated in the research. They acknowledged historical trauma and mistrust affecting Māori engagement with Council. They admitted their approach was often process-driven and one-way instead of people-driven. They recognised that the relationships needed to weather emergencies have to happen well before the event happens.

    Māori are present in these councils. They’re in the rooms, trying to convey exactly this. But presence is not power. The problem isn’t absence of Māori bodies. It’s lack of authority to shift decisions.

    Mid-last year, Thames-Coromandel, with two other District Councils, met specifically to look at these recommendations. They said the research was brilliant. They listened to us. They agreed with us. They voted unanimously to implement the recommendations. Then they parked them.

    The Problem We Can’t Name

    Several months after that unanimous vote, the extreme weather hits again, worse for some than Gabrielle two years before. Marae led the response, providing shelter for stranded travellers and evacuated locals, kai and power for communities cut off from the outside world.

    Mayor Revell quietly told one of our people that TCDC needs help with disaster recovery. But perhaps he can’t publicly acknowledge that the answers are right there in his hands, from us, from Māori who’ve been managing these crises all along.

    That’s the problem. Sound research exists. Homegrown solutions from the people that use environmental tohu and mātauranga exist. A plan of action and the Matike Mai approach exists. Council unanimously agreed to implement it.

    But they still can’t admit that white authority doesn’t have all the answers. That generators should have gone to the marae first. That houseless people deserved shelter during a humanitarian crisis. That the environmental knowledge our communities carry is more valuable than one-size-fits-all approaches from regional authorities who don’t even live here.

    So instead, we get token flying visits where the Prime Minister won’t talk to climate-concerned citizens. Quiet admissions from mayors asking for help. Unanimous votes that lead nowhere while marae continue stepping up without proper resourcing or recognition.

    And whānau keep losing their homes. The pattern repeats because the only thing missing is the courage to publicly acknowledge where the answers came from and actually implement them.

    All of these places will flood again. The extreme weather events are increasing. When it happens, marae will step up because it’s what we do. Councils must act when they first know and must implement what they unanimously agreed to. Otherwise, somewhere in a council office will sit a report with solutions, but no one implemented, because implementing them means admitting we were right all along.

    Paora Moyle KSO is Director of Research at Te Whāriki Manawāhine O Hauraki and led the Hauraki Māori Weathering Cyclone Gabrielle research.

  • Predictive Risk Modelling the State: Turning the Surveillance Apparatus Where It Belongs

    Predictive Risk Modelling the State: Turning the Surveillance Apparatus Where It Belongs

    The Social Investment Agency presents predictive risk modelling as neutral, necessary, and life-saving. It will prevent harm, ensure accountability, and guide evidence-based decisions about who poses a danger to children. The predictive risk models sit atop the Integrated Data Infrastructure, a system that collects, links, and stores every interaction whānau Māori have with state agencies across health, education, justice, benefits, housing, and employment. This data flows one way: into permanent profiles that follow whānau across generations.

    So let us take them at their word.

    If these tools truly identify risk and prevent future harm based on historical patterns of behaviour, then let us apply them where the evidence demands. Let us model the state. The state prosecutes whānau Māori for abuse and neglect, then removes tamariki from their care. Yet the state itself is a failed parent and documented perpetrator of harm. The cauldron calls the kettle black but refuses to apply that logic to itself.

    The State as High-Risk Entity

    Using the SIA’s own framework, what does the data tell us about New Zealand state agencies as predictors of harm to children?

    Between 80 and 90 percent of Māori gang whānau members experienced abuse in state care, according to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Abuse in Care. Our ‘Gang Whānau Healing Intergenerational Trauma’ research confirms this pattern. The state removed these children, claiming to protect them. Instead, it subjected them to violence, neglect, and institutional abuse that scarred them for life. Now, as adults building families and healing from colonial trauma, that same state uses their childhood abuse (the abuse the state inflicted when it removed them from their whānau) as evidence they pose a risk to their own children.

    The IDI ensures this abuse becomes permanent evidence. Every interaction (a parent seeking family violence support, accessing addiction services, asking for housing or financial assistance) enriches the data profile rather than being recognised as help-seeking behaviour. The same system that fails to track institutional patterns of harm meticulously catalogues every moment of struggle in Māori whānau lives.

    In predictive risk modelling terms, this is what researchers call a “feedback loop.” The state creates the harm, records the harm, then uses that record to justify further intervention. If we were modelling any other entity with this pattern, the algorithm would flag it as extremely high risk.

    Nine percent of children in Oranga Tamariki care were abused or neglected in the 2023/24 year (507 children). This represents a significant increase from 2019, when almost six percent of children in care were harmed. For children returned home, thirteen percent were harmed within the monitoring period. In youth residential facilities, twenty percent of children were abused. Of the harm in these facilities, 84 percent was caused by other children and eleven percent by staff members. Current, documented, measurable harm occurs under state supervision.

    The data on long-term outcomes is even more damning. Māori who spent time in the Oranga Tamariki system are nine times more likely to be in emergency housing, six times more likely to be hospitalised for self-harm, and significantly more likely to be victims of crime than Māori who were never in state care. Ninety-two percent of young Māori in youth justice had previous care and protection reports. Being in state care is linked to higher rates of prison admission, unemployment, and suicide.

    If we applied the SIA’s actuarial logic to this data, the state would be classified as a forward liability. It causes measurable harm, destabilises families, and produces negative long-term outcomes at rates far exceeding those of the communities it targets. The fiscal cost alone should trigger intervention. The state spends hundreds of millions managing the consequences of its own failures while refusing to measure the return on that investment.

    The Colonial Project as Risk Factor

    Now let us expand the model. What if we treated colonisation itself as a risk factor and measured the state’s historical patterns of harm against Māori?

    Land confiscation. Forced removal of children over multiple generations. Suppression of te reo Māori. Economic dispossession. Over-policing. Disproportionate imprisonment rates. Erosion of tikanga-based systems of care and accountability.

    Systematic patterns of behaviour documented across more than 180 years. The evidence shows clear intent, consistency, and measurable outcomes. Every one of these actions causes intergenerational trauma, family separation, economic instability, and disconnection from cultural identity (the very factors the SIA now uses to classify whānau Māori as high-risk).

    If a Māori parent had this track record, they would be under surveillance. If a gang member had this pattern of behaviour, they would be monitored, restricted, and subjected to intensive intervention. Yet when the state demonstrates these same patterns across generations, it positions itself as the protector, the expert, the authority with the data and the tools to determine who is safe.

    Accountability Deficit

    Through the Integrated Data Infrastructure, the SIA demands transparency from whānau Māori. It integrates data across agencies to build comprehensive profiles of individuals based on their involvement with police, benefits, health services, education, and child protection. It links this data across generations. It stores it. It analyses it. It uses it to make decisions about the future. Whānau cannot access the full picture of what’s held about them, cannot correct inaccuracies, cannot see how agencies share their information, and cannot opt out. The surveillance is comprehensive, permanent, and unidirectional.

    Yet the state exempts itself from the same scrutiny.

    If we had applied risk assessment models to senior officials throughout their careers, perhaps those who later engaged in misconduct would never have risen through the ranks. If predictive analytics had flagged patterns of institutional failure, perhaps Oranga Tamariki would not have consistently failed to meet minimum care standards for five consecutive years. If data-driven intervention redirected resources based on evidence of harm, state care abuse would not increase year after year.

    The standards placed on Māori parents are not applied within the institutions that judge them, pathologise them, or seek to fix them. The surveillance is unidirectional. The data flows one way. The purpose of these tools is to protect the state from accountability.

    What Predictive Risk Modelling the State Would Actually Look Like

    If we were serious about using these data systems and predictive tools to prevent harm, here is what we would model:

    Risk of child removal based on agency behaviour: Which Oranga Tamariki regions have the highest rates of unsubstantiated investigations? Which social workers have the highest rates of removing Māori children compared to non-Māori children in similar circumstances? What are the predictive indicators that a child removed by the state will be harmed in care?

    Risk of institutional abuse: What are the risk factors within state care facilities that predict abuse by staff or other children? Which residential facilities have the highest rates of harm? What systemic patterns precede those incidents?

    Risk of long-term harm from state intervention: Can we predict which children removed from whānau will experience worse outcomes than if they had remained at home with support? What is the threshold at which state intervention becomes more harmful than the original situation?

    Risk of discriminatory practice: Which policies and practices correlate with disproportionate Māori involvement in state systems? Can we identify which agencies, regions, or individuals demonstrate patterns of bias in their decision-making?

    Risk of policy failure: What is the predictive validity of past government interventions in Māori communities? Which policy approaches have consistently failed to improve outcomes? What are the indicators that a new policy will replicate past harms?

    These are the models we do not see. These are the algorithms the SIA will never build. Predictive risk modelling was never designed to scrutinise power. It was designed to manage populations and justify intervention in the lives of those already marginalised while shielding institutions from examination.

    The Evidence Our Research Provides

    Our research with gang whānau shows what happens when the state refuses this accountability. Wāhine told us about Police sitting outside their homes. Social workers arriving without notice. The most senior people in OT being directed by Police to target them. Every minor injury becoming a file note, an investigation, and reason to uplift tamariki and mokopuna. The surveillance drained their energy and capacity to do the healing mahi they were already engaged with across their gang whānau.

    These wāhine were building strong, culturally grounded families. They were working, paying taxes, raising tamariki, and breaking cycles of trauma. But the state treated their own childhood abuse (abuse the state inflicted when it removed them from their whānau) as evidence their children were unsafe.

    Many lost children to state care based on assumptions and scaled assessments of the likelihood of causing harm. Many of those children were harmed in care. The very outcome the removal was supposed to prevent was caused by the removal itself.

    In our Hauraki Māori Weathering Cyclone Gabrielle research, we documented how whānau-led responses saved lives while state agencies arrived late. In He Whare, He Taonga, we showed that housing discrimination and institutional failures (not Māori parenting) drove instability. In the Takatāpui, Rainbow and MVPFAFF+ Survivor Report, participants told us that whānau support and community-controlled services were the strongest protective factors, while state intervention consistently caused them harm.

    The pattern across all our research shows the deepest harms come from state institutions, not from whānau.

    Why This Matters

    The Social Investment Agency positions its approach as innovative, evidence-based, and child-centred. But evidence is only evidence if you are willing to see what it shows. The data overwhelmingly demonstrates that state intervention in Māori families produces negative outcomes. It increases harm. It destabilises whānau. It perpetuates trauma across generations. Yet the response is always more surveillance, more data collection, more risk assessment tools aimed at Māori communities.

    The SIA practices evidence-resistant decision-making dressed up as science.

    If the SIA genuinely believed its own rhetoric about data-driven decision-making, it would model the state. It would use predictive analytics to identify which agencies and policies pose the greatest risk to tamariki Māori. It would implement transparency mechanisms that allow communities to see how decisions are made and who is accountable when those decisions cause harm. It would redirect resources away from interventions that consistently fail and toward whānau-led, community-controlled approaches that the evidence shows work.

    The Refusal to Model the State Is the Point

    The refusal to apply predictive risk modelling to the state reveals the entire logic of the system. Colonial states do not build tools to examine their own violence. They build tools to manage the populations they have dispossessed, displaced, and harmed.

    The SIA knows what the data would show. The state is the highest-risk entity in the lives of Māori children. State care produces worse outcomes than remaining with whānau. Surveillance destabilises families rather than protecting them. Institutions designed to help Māori perpetuate cycles of harm instead. That is why the model will never be turned around. That is why the surveillance remains unidirectional. That is why the accountability only flows one way.

    One of the wāhine from our gang whānau research spoke about this and how state systems approach whānau Māori: “They don’t fucking work for us. What they do is they open up our mamae. It’s like they come to you, they open up our fucking wounds with a surgical, unclean fucking knife. They whip it open for us, get us to share what’s going on, and then have no idea about how to fucking close the bastard back up. There’s no resolutions for it.”

    There is no genuine apology in the Social Investment Fund. There is no behaviour change. Only new language for the same systems of control.

    Another participant said something else that cuts to the heart of this: “Our jails are full of our men and women that are holding intergenerational trauma that was inflicted by them to begin with. Yes, some of us have become our own abusers, but where the fuck did that infiltrate into our bloodstream? We know exactly where it came in.”

    Our mokopuna carry whakapapa older than any government, stronger than any algorithm, more enduring than any policy. They are part of a history that has survived every form of state intrusion and will continue to survive. Forward liabilities? Lab rats? Data points to be calculated, cohorts to be managed, risks to be modelled? No. They are descendants of ancestors who navigated this whenua long before these institutions existed.

    The evidence across all our research shows tamariki Māori grow up stronger with their own whānau. The state has repeatedly and measurably proven that it cannot be trusted. If we applied the same tools, standards, and scrutiny that the SIA applies to Māori communities, the data would be irrefutable.

    The state is the risk. The state is the harm. The state is the biggest cost. And no amount of data will make that truth disappear.

    Author’s Note: This analysis is written in my independent capacity as a researcher. Te Whāriki Manawāhine O Hauraki engages with the Social Investment Agency as part of our broader work. This engagement reflects a pragmatic reality: if we do not participate, funding will go to Pākehā organisations or those who claim to represent Māori interests without genuine connection to our communities. Our participation allows us to advocate for and provide services to our own people, even as we critique the fundamental assumptions and power structures of these systems.

  • Pū-Rā-Ka-Ū: Indigenous Ecologies of Research, Care and Practice

    I have developed and refined the Pū-Rā-Ka-Ū framework (Wirihana, 2012) across multiple research projects and ecological settings. As the framework has been applied, tested, and adapted in practice, the way it presents has also evolved.

    The images present Pū-Rā-Ka-Ū as a living diagnostic ecology. They show how movement from Mauri Mate to Mauri Ora is understood through relational windows of listening, dialogue, action, and sustained safety, rather than through linear stages or externally imposed measures. Research, care, and practice are held together as part of the same living system, grounded in whakapapa, whenua, and whānau realities over time.

    Author: Paora Moyle KSO, Director of Research at Te Whāriki Manawāhine O Hauraki, leads the application and development of this framework in our research and practice.

    References

    Moyle, P. (2023). As a kid, I always knew who I was – Voices of Takatāpui, Rainbow, and MVPFAFF+ survivors: An independent research report provided to the Abuse in Care Royal Commission. Abuse in Care Royal Commission of Inquiry. https://hauraki.refuge.co.nz/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/FINAL-Rainbow-Report.pdf

    Moyle, P., Kelly, L., & Messiter, D. (2025). Hauraki Māori weathering Cyclone Gabrielle. Te Whāriki Manawāhine O Hauraki. https://hauraki.refuge.co.nz/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Hauraki-Maori-weathering-Cyclone-Gabrielle-Research-Final.pdf

    Te Whāriki Manawāhine O Hauraki. (2024). He Whare, He Taonga Report. Te Whāriki Mana Wāhine o Hauraki. https://www.buildingbetter.nz/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/He-Whare-He-Taonga-FINAL.pdf

    Wirihana, R. (2012). Ngā pūrākau o ngā wāhine rangatira Māori o Aotearoa: The stories of Māori women leaders in New Zealand [Master’s thesis, Massey University]. Massey Research Online. https://mro.massey.ac.nz/handle/10179/4672